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Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) or IEEE 802.11, was formed in 1990 to 
exchange information by using radio frequency rather than wires. This standard 
transmits information by three types of frame: data frame, control frame, and 
management frame. 
 
To provide security for WLANs, different security protocols have been designed such 
as: wired equivalent privacy (WEP), wifi protected access (WPA), and the strongest 
one, IEEE 802.11i (WPA2). Unfortunately all of the mentioned protocols provide 
security only for data frame. Control and management frames are transmitted without 
any protection even in IEEE 802.11i. The lack of protection on management frames 
causes an intruder to launch different types of attack on the WLAN such as forgery, 
session hijacking, denial of service and man-in-the-middle attack, which can lead to 
expose the whole WLAN. 
 
To address the problem, this thesis proposes and evaluates a new per frame security 
model which is called Management Frame with Integrity and Authentication (MFIA) 
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to authenticate transmitted management frames. The proposed model uses a secret key 
and a new random sequence number (RSN) to secure communication between devices 
in WLAN and to prevent intruder from exposing the WLAN. The proposed model 
checks the authentication of a sender and the integrity of the management frames. 
 
The proposed model has been evaluated by quantifying the probability of finding a 
proper RSN by intruder, probability of different current common attacks on 
management frames, and also required time for the specified attacks. The results show 
that MFIA provides a high security level for management frames in all IEEE 802.11 
standards. Required times to launch the attacks, show that allocating the specified 
time by intruder is almost impossible in the proposed model so that makes the 
mentioned attacks impractical. Results also show the proposed model can prevent a 
variety of attacks on management frames.  
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Rangkaian Kawasan Setempat Tanpa Wayar (WLAN) atau IEEE 802.11 dibentuk 
dalam tahun 1990 untuk pertukaran maklumat dengan menggunakan frekuensi radio 
bukannya wayar. Piawai ini menghantar maklumat dengan tiga jenis kerangka: 
kerangka data, kerangka kawalan, dan kerangka pengurusan. 
 
Untuk menyediakan keselamatan bagi WLAN, protokol keselamatan berbeza telah 
direka bentuk seperti: wired equivalent privacy (WEP), wifi protected access (WPA), 
dan yang terkukuh, IEEE 802.11i (WPA2). Malangnya semua protokol yang 
dinyatakan menyediakan keselamatan hanya untuk kerangka data. Kerangka kawalan 
dan pengurusan dihantar tanpa sebarang perlindungan walaupun dalam IEEE 802,11i. 
Kekurangan perlindungan ke atas kerangka pengurusan menyebabkan penceroboh 
melancarkan pelbagai jenis serangan ke atas WLAN seperti pemalsuan, merampas 
sesi, penafian perkhidmatan, dan serangan orang-tengah yang mendedahkan 
keseluruhan WLAN. 
 
Untuk mengatasi masalah ini, tesis ini mencadang dan menilai model keselamatan per  
kerangka yang dipanggil Management Frame with Integrity and Authentication 
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(MFIA) untuk mengesah kerangka pengurusan yang dihantar. Model cadangan 
menggunakan satu kunci rahsia dan nombor jujukan rawak (RSN) untuk melindungi 
komunikasi diantara peranti dalam WLAN dan menghalang penceroboh daripada 
mendedahkan WLAN. Model cadangan memeriksa ketulenan penghantar dan integriti 
kerangka pengurusan. 
 
Model cadangan telah dinilai dengan cara mengkuantitikan keberangkalian untuk 
mencari RSN yang wajar oleh penceroboh, keberangkalian pelbagai serangan yang 
biasa ke atas kerangka pengurusan, dan juga masa yang diperlukan untuk serangan 
tertentu. Keputusan menunjukkan MFIA menyediakan peringkat keselamatan yang 
tinggi untuk kerangka pengurusan dalam semua piawai IEEE 802.11. Masa yang 
diperlukan untuk melancar serangan, menunjukkan bahawa memperuntukkan masa 
tertentu oleh penceroboh adalah hampir mustahil dalam model cadangan yang 
menyebabkan serangan tersebut tidak praktikal. Keputusan juga menunjukkan model 
cadangan dapat menghalang pelbagai serangan ke atas kerangka pengurusan.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background 
Over the past several years, wireless technology has changed the way people 
communicate. In particular, the wireless network technology has become so popular 
that it has already been accepted as an easy alternative to wired networks. Some of 
the advantages of the wireless network technology are: available network access 
without wires everywhere, high data rates, and less price in contrast to wired 
networks.  
 
Among the wireless network technologies, Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) 
or IEEE 802.11 is more popular. The IEEE 802.11 working group was formed in 
1990 and its goal was to create a WLAN that operates in one of the Industrial, 
Scientific, and Medical (ISM) frequency ranges. 
 
The first IEEE 802.11 standard was released in 1997 (Henley, 2000) and after that 
three other standards IEEE 802.11a,b, and g were released. IEEE 802.11 uses radio 
frequency to transmit and receive data over the air by exchanging three kinds of 
frame: control, data and management frame.  
 
With rapidly growing of the WLANs, security is very important for a safe 
communication between wireless stations. Therefore different protocols have been 
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designed to provide security for all IEEE 802.11 standards.  
 
Unfortunately these protocols only put much attention on securing data frames, and 
less on securing management frames and control frames. Currently, management 
frames use Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC-32 bit) algorithm for security but CRC 
is useful only for unintentional error detection of the management frames and can 
not provide any security in form of authentication or privacy.  
 
Hence an unprotected management frame can be used by intruder to start different 
attacks like injecting new forgery management frames, modify existing management 
frames, denial of service attack and other kinds of attack on management frames to 
break into the whole WLAN. 
 
Thereby, this thesis presents a new model to provide a strong security mechanism to 
avoid possible common attacks on management frames, which is called 
Management Frame with Integrity and Authentication (MFIA).  
 
1.2 Problem Statements  
IEEE 802.11 provides strong security for data frames but control and management 
frames are transmitted without any protection. Management frames are transmitted 
in form of request and response. This means, a sender transmits management frame 
request and then receives related management frame response. Whereas control 
frames are transmitted as exchanging for data frames. Control frames do not carry 
  3
important information and generally they are used to acknowledge data frames. 
Since management frames do not apply any control frame in their transmission 
(ANSI IEEE 802.11, 1999) therefore this research attempts to propose a new model 
to provide sufficient security for management frames. 
 
The current security for management frames is CRC algorithm which can not 
protect management frames against malicious attacks (Sood and Eszenyi, 2006; 
Bellardo and Savage, 2003). Hence, the following problems on management frames 
have been identified: 
 
• Management frames will be accepted easily by the receiver who carries out 
the specified function of the management frame without checking whether 
the sender is a legitimate user or if the management frame has not been 
modified during transmission. In this situation an intruder can easily spoof 
these frames and send forgery management frames as an authorized user to 
launch different kinds of attack. 
 
• There is a sequence number field in the header of management frames. This 
field is a sequential number and it ranges from 0 to 4095 and gets reset every 
time the station restarts. The sequence numbers are predictable and are not 
encrypted. Therefore with knowledge of the current sequence number, the 
adversary can easily set a proper sequence number for his forgery 
management frames (Wright, 2003). 
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1.3 Objectives of the Research 
This research has two objectives: 
 
• To design and implement a new model to provide a strong security for 
management frames in WLAN. This proposed model has two main 
functions: authentication of the sender and integrity of the management 
frame. In case of a successful authentication and integrity, the receiver will 
accept the original management frame. Any problem during authentication 
and integrity process causes the receiver to assume there is an attack on the 
management frame and discards it. 
 
• To add a new Random Sequence Number (RSN) to avoid an intruder easily 
set a proper sequence number for his forgery management frame. The 
proposed model produces a random sequence number to make the MFIA 
more difficult to figure out by an intruder. This means an intruder will need 
more attempt in guessing the correct value of the random sequence number 
therefore makes the proposed model stronger.  
 
1.4 Scope of the Research 
This research considers unicast management frames to protect. They are chosen 
because currently the most important problems of the management frames are 
forgery and collision attacks which are basis of other types of attack. On the other 
hands these two important attacks can be started just by using unicast management 
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frames because of their specified functions. Unicast management frames can be 
used by intruder to change one of the addresses in their header to use the functions. 
For example by changing the destination address in the header of a disassociation 
management frame to a broadcast address intruder can force all the stations in the 
WLAN to be disconnected from the network.  
 
Hence an unprotected unicast management frames provide a powerful arsenal to an 
attacker, who can discover the layout of the network, find the location of devices 
and start more successful denial-of-service attacks against a network (Epstein, 2006; 
Wright, 2007).   
 
But role of the broadcast management frames is different and they are rarely used. 
These frames typically are used to adjust radio frequency properties or find a proper 
access point for stations, rather than report sensitive information (Epstein, 2006; 
Wright, 2007 ). 
 
1.5 Thesis Organization 
This thesis is divided into 6 chapters. The first chapter shows a background of the 
problem that this research tries to solve. The objectives of this research are also 
stated in this chapter. 
 
Chapter 2 provides an introduction to IEEE 802.11 topologies and standards. It 
explains the two basic wireless network layers, physical and medium access control 
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layer, and different techniques for transmission data over these two layers. It also 
discusses all kinds of wireless network frame and their functions. 
 
Chapter 3 explains existing security protocols in IEEE 802.11 medium access 
control layer. It presents security process; authentication, confidentiality and 
integrity, in the mentioned protocols. It shows the current algorithm to protect 
management frame and also describes common current security threats and 
vulnerabilities on management frames. This chapter shows related works that have 
been done before in relation to the problem of management frames. 
 
In chapter 4 the proposed model is introduced to improve and enhance security of 
the management frames and then the proposed model will be simulated by a 
program in JavaScript and HTML. Step taken in the source code of the program also 
is shown in this chapter. 
 
In chapter 5, first the proposed model will be implemented to show its correctness 
and after that it will be evaluated to show its effectiveness to enhance the security of 
the wireless networks, and then a comparison between the proposed model and 
current algorithm (CRC) will be discussed. It also will show the result of the 
comparison of the proposed model against the current algorithm and will discuss the 
probability of different kinds of common attack on them. 
 
Conclusion will be discussed in chapter 6 and it explains the strength of the 
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proposed model to prevent a variety of common attacks related to management 
frames and then it proves the proposed model can enhance the security of the entire 
WLAN. Finally it states the contributions of this research and suggests future works 
to improve security of WLANs. 
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CHAPTER 2 
IEEE 802.11 MEDIUM ACCESS CONTROL LAYER  
 
This chapter provides descriptions of WLAN topologies and its standards and also 
describes IEEE 802.11 layers with their related frames. 
 
2.1 IEEE 802.11 Topologies 
Two network topologies are defined in the IEEE 802.11: infrastructure network and 
Ad-Hoc network (Arbaugh et al., 2001). In fact, the difference between them is only 
in how the devices communicate to each other. 
 
2.1.1 Infrastructure Network 
An infrastructure WLAN (which is the focus of this thesis) consists of several 
clients talking to an Access Point (AP) which is usually connected to a wired 
network like home LAN. IEEE 802.11 is based on a cellular architecture where the 
system is subdivided into cells. Each cell called Basic Service Set (BSS) which is 
controlled by an AP. So infrastructure mode of operation also is called a BSS (Xiao 
et al., 2004). This is shown in Figure 2.1. 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Infrastructure Network 
